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Abstract - New generation radio equipment, used by
soldiers and vehicles on the battlefield, constitute ad
hoc networks and specifically, Mobile Ad hoc NETworks
(MANET). The battlefield where these equipment are
deployed includes a majority of coalition communica-
tion. Each group on the battleground may communicate
with other members of the coalition and establish inter-
MANETs links. Operational communications tend to pro-
vide tactical ad hoc networks some capacities. There is a
better broadband radio in UHF band (ex: NATO - 225-
400 MHz) and some heterogeneous services such as voice
or video (ex: capture from a drone) are provided. Several
Network-layer protocols have been proposed in order to
handle inter-domain routing for tactical MANETs. In this
paper, we present a coalition context and describe the
functional hypothesis we used. Then, we propose a protocol
that would fit such a network and conduct experimentation
that tend to show that our proposition is quite efficient.
I. INTRODUCTION
New generation radio equipment, used by soldiers and
vehicles on the battlefield, constitute ad hoc networks, namely,
Mobile Ad hoc NETworks (MANET).
The increasing needs in data rate in the lowest tactical levels
implies an important number of nodes and a high density
of tactical radio equipment. These equipment have a high
mobility potential.
Usually, the battlefield is composed of several nations,
grouped under a coalition against the same enemies. Tac-
tical ad hoc military networks, forming MANETs, have to
connect and operate with tactical radio networks but also
with other military networks (e.g.: satellite communications
with metropolis). Military operation evolution considerably
increased coalition needs and interoperability for the tactical
networks. Information can be exchanged between heteroge-
neous networks fluidly in order to have a better information
and gain a tactical advantage.
In order to have an efficient coalition, nations have to
communicate. Therefore, MANETs would be organized dif-
ferently due to the independence of each nation constituting
the coalition. Depending on the trust in other nations, some
MANETs would like to control the level of data they exchange.
Thus, some sensitive data would be sent to defined groups
rather than others with less confidence. Accordingly, we have
a coalition organized with different groups which want to
communicate data, while maintaining control over the sensitive
data and their destination; which could be done through
routing policies. In this paper, we deal with the exchange of
routing information (not application data information), and the
construction of route between nodes.
Such a situation has been encountered in the past to build
the Internet where network operators had to collaborate. These
groups (networks of operators) have to exchange data but
want to keep their network organization confidential and keep
control of the shared data with other operators. Nowadays,
those groups are called Autonomous Systems (AS) [7]. BGP
(Border Gateway Protocol) interconnects the AS to make the
Internet possible, regarding the requirements on routing policy.
BGP allows each AS to select trusted ASes with which they
want to communicate and the routing information to share.
Nowadays, BGP is mainly used on the Internet and is known to
fit inter-domain requirements for the wired networks. However,
due to the characteristics of BGP wired networks such as
manual configuration, no mobility or long route recovery time,
BGP is not adaptable to ad hoc networks for inter-MANET
communications. In this paper, after a thorough analysis of
MANET constraints and interactions between network and
security layers (which is mandatory), we propose a new
protocol called ITMAN that would provide efficient inter-
MANET routing in tactical MANETs.
This paper is organized as follows. First in Section II,
we present our operational environment and the functional
hypothesis we used to design our protocol. Then, we describe
in Section III the algorithms that handle situations of an
operational battleground. The efficiency of our protocol is
evaluated in Section V. Finally, we focus on the new elements
brought by our protocol and compare them with existing inter-
MANET protocols.
II. OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
As described before, tactical ad hoc networks should be able
to collaborate with other MANETs in a coalition, whereby
each MANET is under an independent authority. Before de-
tailing the proposed solution, we begin by introducing some
definitions and assumptions.
A. Group Definition
We define a group as a set of nodes able to communicate
together. This leads to two types of constraints:
i) communications should depend on the used network
technologies.
ii) communications should depend on organisational con-
straints such as ciphered communication.
1) Network Capabilities: As the members of a group has
to communicate with each others, this implies that network
topologies are compatible; meaning that layer 3 protocols
(Network Layer) are compatible, for example all the nodes use
IPv4 (resp. IPv6). Furthermore, layer 2 protocols (Data-Link
Layer) should also be compatible. Therefore, all the nodes
should use the same technology (UHF/VHF, CSMA/Wifi,
TDMA, etc.). This constraint of homogeneity is also present
for the used routing protocol. Although we talk here about
homogeneity, this does not mean that only one technology is
used by a node. Indeed, a node can have multiple communica-
tion devices and support multiple technologies. Nevertheless,
a group is homogeneous and needs to keep the ad hoc
philosophy that avoids single point of failure. That is, if a node
supports multiple technologies, this means that all the nodes of
the group should support these technologies. These constraints
describe a group in term of communication capabilities, which
is not sufficient. We also consider the fact that if a group
is under an authority, the latter should keep control over its
communication. Indeed, as we are in ad hoc mode, if an
external node (node not in the group) with the same layer 2,
layer 3 and routing capabilities enters in the communication
range, it is able to communicate with the group (as in ad
hoc networks, nodes can communicate regardless of their IP
prefixes [6]). This advocates for ciphered communication in
order to keep control over the exchanged data.
2) Organisationnal Capabilities: We assume that tactical
nodes have to cipher their communications. This defacto
creates a group, as any node without the cryptographic material
(i.e. the credentials) cannot understand the communication.
Given that security material management is out of scope
of this paper, we just made some assumptions that seem
realistic in our context. During the mission planning of
a coalition, each node is assigned, (at least) a certified
public/private key pair with the associated certificate and the
(trusted) certificates of authorities used in the coalition. Inside
a group, each node can send ciphered and/or signed messages.
With these assumptions, technologies used in the group are
homogeneous. Thus, nodes can communicate even if different
technologies are used as each node can act as a gateway.
Cryptography isolates communication inside the group.
To satisfy all the requirements of an inter-MANET routing
protocol (i.e. requirements described in [3]), we will consider
two aspects. First, the routing aspects that cover the freshness
and update of the routing tables during the networks lifetime.
Second, the security and routing policy aspects to be handled.
Indeed, groups are under the same coalition, but they probably
do not want to share all the routing information. Some
communications are more sensitive than others, and hence they
should not be routed through some MANETs constituting the
coalition. It is necessary to respect those policies. For example,
a policy routing of a MANET A can say that this MANET
can send packets to the MANET B, unless packets must go
through MANET C to reach MANET B.
III. THE ITMAN PROTOCOL
In this section, we present the main algorithms composing
the ITMAN protocol. The idea of this protocol is to take ad-
vantage of the security policy (i.e. cryptographic material and
encryption) to define a group. Groups are able to communicate
with each other by creating links, which may be compared to
tunnels. These tunnels are built according to the local policy
and are encrypted with a shared key. Shared key generation is
discussed later.
A. Definitions and notations
As mentionned in section II, a node owns pre-defined
elements. The latter are needed to communicate inside its own
group or with other groups, or to merge with another group.
Table I describes the elements owned by a node N at the
beginning of the mission.
OGN The node’s Original Group Number
KPriv(N)/KPub(N) Public/Private key pair
Cert(N)CA A certificate signed by the authority CA for the
node Ni covering its public key and its OGN
Cert(CAi) Trusted Certificate of the CA used in the
coalition
K(OGN) Key to communicate inside the OGN group
PolicyList Policies to apply with other groups
Table I: Elements owned by a node N
To build communications between nodes or between groups,
we define three communication channels:
• Intra-group channel: Channel encrypted by a Key
K(OGN) inside a given group
• Inter-group channel: Channel encrypted by a shared Key
between two different groups
• General channel: Channel used for Beaconing, beacons
are clear text
B. Mission planning
Before starting a mission, some steps are needed in order
to enable communications inside a group. First, elements
described in Table I have to be loaded in each node. The
K(OGN) key will be used to cipher communication (in our
case at least routing information) inside the group OGN .
For a seek of simplicity only one key is used. Solutions like
multiple keys, key rollover and so on could also be used to
add more flexibility in the key management. Being encrypted,
the routing information provided by the nodes of the group
cannot be understood by an external node.
During the mission planning, the PolicyList is also de-
cided. We define three policies between groups:
• Deny: no communication with the other group
• Link: a communication is possible with a unique link
between the two groups (i.e. only one node of each group
acts as a gateway)
• Merge: every node of the group 1 will communicate
(directly or not) with all the nodes of the group 2,
whatever the number of links is
For a given group, the PolicyList contains all the associa-
tions (policy, OGN) for all the OGN involved in the mission.
C. Beaconing routine
During the mission, nodes communicate inside their group
with K(OGN). However, an external node in the communi-
cation range could not understand the packets. Thus, we use
a beaconing system with non-encrypted packets to discover
neighbors.
Algorithm 1 Beaconing routine
1: Periodically broadcast (Cert(A)CA,Timestamp)SigKPriv(A)
2: while true do
3: if Receive (Cert(B)CA,Timestamp)SigKPriv(B) then
4: if Verify(SigKPriv(B)) & Verify(Timestamp) &
Verify(Cert(A)CA) then
5: Extract OGN from Cert(B)CA
6: if It is a new OGN then
7: Check(PolicyList)
8: end if
9: end if
10: end if
11: end while
Each node periodically broadcasts a beacon to announce
its presence. This packet contains elements to authenticate
the node and a time-stamp to mitigate replay attacks. When
receiving this kind of packet, a node verifies the signature, the
time-stamp and the certificate. If the OGN of the sender is
not a current active group for the receiver, the latter checks
the PolicyList and acts accordingly.
In case of a Deny policy, no more exchanges are made.
Indeed, even if two groups are close to each other, they are
kept separated since they are using different K(OGN) keys.
In the following subsections, we explain how we create
communication to respect a Link or Merge policy.
D. Link Policy Routine
When A receives a beacon from node B of another group
with an associated Link Policy, A and B have to create
a ciphered channel. As the PolicyList is created during
the mission planning, we assume that the PolicyLists are
consistent (if A trusts B, B trusts A). Algorithm 2 illustrates
the creation of a link between A and B (from the point of
view of A). We assume that both nodes are in communication
range and have received a beacon from each other.
After receiving a beacon, if the policy is to create a link,
both nodes negotiate a shared key. This key could be loaded
during the mission planning or be the result of an authenticated
Algorithm 2 Link Policy Routine
1: if Check(PolicyList) = Link then
2: Negotiate the Shared Key KAB
3: Send reachable OGN to group B through the KAB en-
crypted channel
4: Receive reachable OGN from B through KAB en-
crypted channel
5: if Reachable OGN are consistent with the PolicyList
then
6: When needed encrypt routing data with KAB
7: end if
8: end if
Diffie-Hellman exchange for example. Then, both nodes use
this secure channel to tell with which groups they are able
to route packets. Then, each node can decide to follow up
the process and exchange routing information or to close the
communication. The following example (Fig 1) illustrates why
the communication could be closed.
Figure 1: ”Transitivity” of trust
Let A from OGNA, B from OGNB and C from OGNC
be three nodes from three different groups. We assume the
following policies exist: (i) Link between OGNA and OGNB ,
(ii) Link between OGNB and OGNC and (iii) Deny between
OGNA and OGNC . If the protocol processes correctly, noth-
ing prevents group OGNB from revealing routing information
about group OGNA to group OGNC and vice-versa; that is
why A and B have to exchange reachable OGN from their
group. If the node B announced to A that the group OGNC
is reachable, then A may decide to prefer the Deny policy
even for the group OGNB in order to protect its routing
information.
After the tunnel creation, ad hoc routing protocol runs
as usual on each “gateway”. Then, routing data exchange
proceeds as follow (Figure 2):
• A node in group OGNA sends routing data ciphered with
K(OGNA).
• The packet arrives to the “gateway” of the group OGNA.
The packet is decrypted and if forwarding is needed, the
packet is sent two times once encrypted with KAB and
once encrypted with K(OGNA).
(a) Routing Data Packet generated in OGNA
(b) Routing Data Packet processed and forwarded
(c) Routing Data Packet processed in OGNB
Figure 2: Routing Data exchange with a Link Policy
• The packet arrives to the “gateway” of the group OGNB .
The packet is encrypted with KAB , decrypted, processed
and then re-encrypted with K(OGNB).
• Inside the group OGNB , the packet is encrypted and
decrypted with K(OGNB).
E. Merge policy Routine
When a node A receives a beacon from a node B of another
group with an associated Merge Policy, the two nodes have to
create common cryptographic material (a shared key). Unlike
in the Link policy, this time the shared key is broadcasted to
all the nodes of the group OGNA and to all the nodes of
the group OGNB . Algorithm 3 illustrates the different steps
between node A and node B for a merge between two groups.
The idea is that once the shared key is created and broad-
casted, all the nodes of OGNA and OGNB groups can directly
exchanged routing data by encrypted it with KAB.
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
A. Key Management and Validity
As we have seen above, notion of group is closely linked to
cryptographic material. In the protocol description, we assume
Algorithm 3 Merge policy routine
1: if Check(PolicyList) = Merge then
2: Negotiate the Shared Key KAB
3: Send reachable OGN to group B through the KAB en-
crypted channel
4: Receive reachable OGN from B through KAB en-
crypted channel
5: if Reachable OGN are consistent with the PolicyList
then
6: Broadcast KAB in the group channel (ciphered with
K(OGN)
7: end if
8: end if
Figure 3: Link policy on a splitted group
that a node owns the key of its own group and will negotiate
a shared key to communicate with other group according to
its communication policy. As we are in a coalition environ-
ment with a mission planning, to minimize communication
and computation overhead, we also can assume that during
the mission planning, the different authorities have already
negotiated shared keys according to their communication poli-
cies. Moreover, these shared keys are loaded into the nodes
before the mission starts. Then, we reduce the number of key
negotiation between members of different groups that want to
exchange routing data.
Concerning the validity of the shared keys, as they will be
used to encrypt routing data, it is important to delete a shared
key when it is not needed anymore. For example, when two
groups are not connected anymore (no beacon received), a
timer is launched. Once the timer is out, the key is deleted
and will be renegotiated if needed. Another possibility for the
key deletion is a direct order from the hierarchy, for example,
if a policy between two groups changes and the shared key
does not fit anymore this new policy.
B. Policy and mobility issues
Another particular case that can occur due to mobility is
illustrated Figure 3.
Two groups OGNA and OGNB are sharing routing data
by using a Link policy. The group OGNA splits into two
parts. One part of the group OGNA moves around OGNB
and finally reconnects with it. Considering the situation from
OGNB point of view, it shares a Link policy with OGNA
that stipulates only one link between the two groups. Now, the
second part of OGNA should not be rejected, as it is physically
two distinct groups. Therefore, we propose the following
solution: once the node has been authenticated during the
beaconing routine, the node B2 sends a ping to A4. The
following cases can arise:
1) There is no entry in its routing table ⇒ this corresponds
to a split, therefore a second link has to be created.
2) There is no response to the ping ⇒ this is a split but
the old route is not yet deleted by the routing protocol,
therefore a second link has to be created.
3) There is a response ⇒ A4 is already reachable, this is
not a split, no link has to be created.
V. LATENCY EVALUATION
To evaluate the ITMAN protocol, we measured the latency
caused by encryption. The test consists in measuring the delay
between the reception of the first OLSR Hello packet and the
creation of a new route in the routing table.
The test environment is composed by two laptops on top of
Intel Core i3-400 CPU with two 2.4 GHz cores, 4 Gigabytes
of memory and running a Debian 8 distribution (kernel 3.16).
During the experiment, we have to intercept OLSR packets
to encrypt payload. Packet sniffing and interception is done
with iptables and NFQUEUE option. Packet manipulation and
encryption is done with Python scripts and Scapy1. We decide
to modify packets on the fly rather than modify the OLSR
code. This allows to test different implementations of OLSR.
To evaluate the latency caused by encryption, we run three
tests:
• First test: packets are just intercepted by NFQUEUE and
forwarded as is,
• Second test: packets are intercepted by NFQUEUE,
checksum and header/packet length are re-computed,
• Third test: packets are intercepted by NFQUEUE, OLSR
payload is encrypted, checksum and header/packet length
are re-computed.
As encryption modifies the packet length, we need to re-
compute checksum and packet length, that is why we have
done the second test to estimate latency generated by this
computation (without encryption). The test runs as follows:
the first laptop is configured with OLSR timer following the
recommendation of the RFC 2636 (Hello 2s, TC 5s) , while
a python script intercepts the OLSR packets. Depending on
the test number, it forwards, re-computes or encrypts packets
with AES-128. On the second laptop, OLSR packets are also
intercepted with NFQUEUE (and decrypted if needed). We
check time when the first Hello is received and when the route
is added to the routing table.
These tests have been conducted a thousand of times each.
Figure 4 shows the distribution of this delay for the two
communication modes (encrypted and non-encrypted).
Table II synthesizes statistic values to easily compare the
two experimentation. It shows that our proof-of-concept based
1http://www.secdev.org/projects/scapy/
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Figure 4: Route adding time comparison
Simple Interception N-E payload E payload
Mean value (sec) 9.01 9.08 9.35
Standard dev. (sec) 2.07 2.53 2.35
Table II: Route adding time (non-encrypted (N-E) and en-
crypted (E) OLSR)
on iptables rules and python scripts does not add a significant
delay even if Python is known to be slow. The encryption
of the OLSR payload add less than 300ms in the neighbor
discovery process. We can also note that with a complete
implementation of our protocol, time due to checksum com-
putation and NFQUEUE interception can be reduced. This
gain can be increased using language more suited than Python.
Another delay we evaluate is that if the shared keys are not
loaded during the mission planning, they have to be computed
in our beaconing process. We measured the time needed to
the creation of a shared key during the first encounter of two
nodes. On a thousand of shared key creations, the mean delay
is about 0.5 second which is perfectly acceptable.
VI. RELATED WORK
Several works have been proposed to solve the issue of
inter-MANET communication in tactical networks.
In [9], the authors propose the Inter-MANET Routing
protocol (InterMR). This protocol proposes features such
as BGP which are an inter-domain routing table, external
and internal messages and a beaconing routine to know the
current neighborhood. The address plan of a MANET is based
on a Bloom Filter [1], [2], which synthesizes all members
of the group. Inter-domain communication is made with
gateways election process, which is based on their traffic.
InterMR is an evolution of a previous protocol designed
by the authors, namely InterDomain Routing for MANET
(IDRM [4]). Compare to this solution, our proposition does
not need a Name Server to know which nodes belong to the
AS. Indeed, a group is defined by a cryptographic group
key that guarantees intra-group communications only. The
messages cannot be processed from the point of view of an
external member of this group. Our experiments showed that
ITMAN does not involve significant overhead and can be an
alternative to the Bloom Filter and gateway election systems.
Two evolution of BGP have been proposed in [8] and
[10]. The first proposition is named BGP-MX for BGP
Mobility eXtension, where the main contribution is the DPBS
(Distributed Peer Broker Service), a central name server.
Nodes are permanently connected to this server and get
their network information (IP address, AS number...) from it.
Thus, this system is not fully distributed and can be easily
weakened if the DPBS is out of order. This solution brings
a central element that needs a permanent connection. In our
proposition, configuration and route discovering are fully
distributed in the network and can be done by each node in
the MANET. Furthermore, routing information are calculated
by the OLSR protocol and not provided by an external server.
The second evolution is BGP-MR (BGP Manet Routing)
described in [10]. BGP-MR runs in collaboration with
OSPF-MDR, an evolution of OSPFv3 [5]. The OSPF DR
(Designated Router) elected are used to easily transmit
information all over the network. All nodes act as gateways.
Two states exist: passive and active. In passive mode, a node
behaves as a simple router. However, it does not prevent
it to listen to beacons in order to detect new neighbors. If
a neighbor from a different AS is close, the node turns on
an active gateway and distributes its routing information
with this neighbor. In case of AS split or merge, BGP-MR
removes from its routing table all the entries provided by the
missing neighbor, in order to keep fresh and valid routes.
Membership in an AS is memorized thanks to a Bloom Filter.
In our protocol, we do not use a Bloom Filter as explained
above. Furthermore, we do not use specific nodes in the
network such as Designated Router to route the packets.
Finally, we proposed a solution to handle policy issues, as
authors suggested as future work.
In [11], CIDR (Cluster-based Inter-Domain Routing) pro-
tocol uses a cluster approach. In the AS, a node is elected
as a Cluster Head based on its significance from the point
of view of traffic. Its role is to centralize the information
and redistribute routing information. AS membership is known
thanks to a Bloom Filter. CIDR supports some situations of
splitting and merging. Indeed, resulting AS of a mobility
scenario must be identical of a previous one, particularly in
merge processes. With our proposition, merging conditions are
relaxed. Mobility is free and communications can be created
wherever the nodes are. Finally, there is no central point of
failure. Nodes are able to calculate routes with the routing
policy list they embed during the operation.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this article, we proposed a new inter-MANET routing
protocol for tactical networks. We first defined our operational
environment, particularly in terms of used layer 2 and 3
technologies, group definition and organisational capabilities.
Then, we proposed algorithms based on cryptography to both
ensure inter-MANET communication and security. To evaluate
the performance of these new algorithms, we used an exper-
imental platform to measure the delay added by encryption.
The results of experiments showed that cryptography does not
add significant latency. Thus, ITMAN brings some new so-
lutions to inter-MANET communication in tactical networks.
Communications are isolated inside a group and cannot be
understood if intercepted. Furthermore, the beaconing routine
provides a quick reaction to neighbor discovery and route
creation. Finally, we discussed about policy conflicts, crypto-
graphic material generation and validity in operational context.
As future work, we plan to deploy the ITMAN in a full
real context, with several groups and policies in order to
evaluate application level performance. Second, we plan to
study policy conflict in a huge coalition. Finally, we will to
have routing policy that can include non-military entities such
as non-governmental organizations (i.e. group of nodes that do
not participate to the mission planning and that do not have
credential).
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